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Research Notes
Tracking Radical Opinions in Polls of U.S. Muslims
by Veronika Fajmonová, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley
Abstract
This Research Note examines two telephone polls (2007, 2011) and three Internet polls (2016) to track opinions
of U.S. Muslims relating to the war on terrorism. Results indicate that a small but consistent minority (five to ten
percent) justify suicide bombing of civilians in defense of Islam, while those seeing the war on terrorism as a war
on Islam have declined from more than half to about a third. This decline coincided with a decline in perception
of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S., and correlational results confirm that perceived discrimination
is one source of seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam. Other results from both the Pew and Internet
polls show that disapproval of U.S. foreign policies affecting Muslims also contributes to seeing a war on Islam.
Discussion emphasizes the value of Internet polling for tracking shifts in the opinions of U.S. Muslims, but
acknowledges that polling has not yet discovered what is different about the small minority who justify suicide
bombing.
Keywords: Opinion Polls, U.S. Muslims, war on terror, Internet polling
Introduction

I

t has long been recognized that effective counter-terrorism programs require more than finding, fixing,
and finishing those who have turned to political violence. Beyond radical action, there are radical beliefs
that can inspire and justify political violence. These beliefs define the battleground of the ‘war of ideas’.
Some indication of the importance attached to this war is the fact that googling “Terrorism ‘war of ideas’” in
March 2017 produced over seven million hits.
In this Research Note we first consider the jihadist narrative, then track the elements of this narrative in
beliefs of U.S. Muslims as represented in two Pew telephone polls and three smaller Internet polls. We are
interested in two questions. First, what changes over time can be discerned in opinions of U.S. Muslims
relating to the war on terrorism? Are radical opinions becoming more common, less common, or staying the
same? Second, are there any useful predictors of radical opinions related to the jihadist narrative? What do
we know about how and why some U.S. Muslims maintain radical opinions?
What is the Jihadist Narrative?
Thomas Johnson identified jihadist narrative themes from analysis of primary Taliban sources: “An appeal
to past Afghan struggles against ‘foreign invaders.’” “The battle between the Taliban and the Karzai ‘puppet’
regime and its foreign coalition represents a ‘cosmic conflict’ between the ‘righteous’ and the infidel.”
“Afghans have a collective religious responsibility to fight the apostates and invaders.”[1]
David Betz offers a similar summary of the elements of the narrative of Global Jihad: “(1) Islam is under
general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the United States; (2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as
‘terrorists,’ are defending against this attack; (3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportionally
just and religiously sanctified; and, therefore (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.”[2]
The narrative of Global Jihad is conveniently represented as a pyramid of radicalization (Figure 1) in which
the base includes Muslims who currently do not accept any of the narrative. The layer above the base includes
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those who sympathize with the first element of the jihadist frame: that the West is waging a war on Islam
(narrative level 1, pyramid level 2). Next higher in the pyramid are Muslims who believe that jihadis are
acting in defense of Islam and that their actions are morally and religiously justified (narrative elements 2
and 3, pyramid level 3). Highest in the pyramid of opinion radicalization are Muslims who believe there is an
individual duty to support and participate in the defense of Islam (narrative element 4, pyramid level 4.
Figure 1. Opinion Radicalization Pyramid

Tracking Radical Opinions in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims
There is reason to believe that different Muslim communities in the US may have different views of political
issues. Such differences might arise initially from the political contexts that moved different groups to
emigrate from their homelands. Many Iranians came to the US, for instance, when the Shah was toppled.
Somalis came to the US when famine and violence made their homeland a dangerous place. But experience
in their new homes must also play a role in determining immigrants’ political and social attitudes. For
example, some believe that the European experience of jihadist terrorism has been worse than the US
experience because Europe is less accepting of immigrants.[3]
Recognizing that immigrant groups can differ markedly in their cultures and their political viewpoints,
McCauley and Scheckter used the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims to compare seven origin groups defined by
country of birth: Pakistanis, Iranians, South Asians, Arabs, sub-Saharan Africans, Europeans, and AfricanAmericans. Results indicated substantial group differences, with Iranian-born and African-Americans
standing out from other groups in their political opinions.[4]
In this section we conduct the same kind of origin group comparisons for the 2011 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims,
with special attention to possible opinion changes between 2007 and 2011.
Challenges of Polling U.S. Muslims
Muslims in the US constitute less than one percent of the population and different ethnic and origin
subgroups of U.S. Muslims are correspondingly smaller percentages. Standard polling methods, such as
random-digit dialing or address sampling, are impractical when the target group will comprise less than one
percent of those sampled.
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Nevertheless, there have been polls of US Muslims using one or both of two approaches to getting the sample.
[5] The first approach is to accumulate Muslim respondents who turn up in national polls, using standard
probability sampling techniques. Over many U.S. national polls, a polling company identifies a number of
Muslim respondents; these individuals can then be contacted all at once in a poll targeting only Muslims.
The second approach is to sample randomly from neighborhoods known to have a relatively high proportion
of Muslim residents. The odds of calling a Muslim can thereby be raised, although Muslims living outside
‘Muslim neighborhoods’ will likely be under-represented in this approach.
Polls of U.S. Muslims have typically used a combination of the two approaches, but the samples thus obtained
have usually been too small to permit fractionating the sample to compare subgroups defined by birthplace.
The 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims are exceptional in the size of the sample obtained: each Pew
poll had over a thousand respondents.[6] Our study takes advantage of these larger samples to compare
groups of U.S. Muslims based on country of birth, and to look for change in the pattern of group results
between 2007 and 2011.
There is a special challenge in identifying African-American Muslims in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls.
Pew has estimated that 2.35 million Americans are Muslim, and that 20% of these are African-American
(indicating approximately 470,000 African-American Muslims).[7] African-American Muslims are typically
members of one of several (typically Sunni) groups, including the American Society of Muslims (the
descendent of the original Nation of Islam), the new Nation of Islam (now led by Louis Farrakhan), the Five
Percenters, the Dar al-Islam, the Islamic Mission of America, and other smaller organizations. Though some
use the term “Black Muslims,” historically this term has had specific connotations in relation to the Nation of
Islam; in this Research Note we refer to African-American Muslims.[8]
Unfortunately the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls did not explicitly ask whether respondents were AfricanAmerican. Thus, rather than looking at all Pew respondents born in the US, our analysis focused on AfricanAmerican Muslims as defined by three criteria: born in the US, both parents born in the U.S., and selfidentified as “Black.”
In sum, we compare origin groups in both the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims, focusing on three
questions tapping radical ideas: opinion of the war on terrorism, opinion of Al-Qaeda, and opinion of suicide
bombing in defense of Islam.
2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims—Methods
In this section we describe the number of respondents in each origin group for the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls
of U.S. Muslims, the treatment of missing data, and the use of unweighted data in our analyses.
Overview of respondents in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims. The 2007 Pew Poll had 1050
respondents, including 28 coded missing for place of birth and 15 born in countries coded as ‘other. There
were 273 respondents reporting they were born in the US; 135 were identified as African-American Muslims
and the remaining 138 respondents do not appear in this report. The total of 2007 Pew Poll respondents
represented in this report is thus 869 (1050-28-15-138).
The 2011 Pew Poll had 1033 respondents, including 19 missing place of birth and 95 born in countries coded
by Pew as ‘other’. There were 289 respondents reporting they were born in the US; 110 were identified as
African-American Muslims and the remaining 179 do not appear in this report. The total of 2011 Pew Poll
respondents represented in this report is thus 740 (1033-19-95-179).
Groups defined by birthplace. This report follows the procedures used by McCauley and Scheckter with the
2007 Pew poll to identify six origin groups among respondents of the 2011 Pew poll.[9] In 2011 as in 2007,
two countries had large enough numbers of emigrants to form separate groups: Pakistan (158) and Iran (58).
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South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) had 125 emigrants, Arab countries had 219
emigrants, and Sub-Saharan Africa had 70 emigrants. In addition, we identified African-American Muslims
as those who self-identified as Black and who reported being born in the US with both father and mother
also born in the U.S.
In their analysis of the 2007 poll, McCauley and Scheckter identified a seventh origin group: emigrants from
European countries (59 respondents).[10] In 2011, however, there were only about 4% of foreign-born U.S.
Muslims coming from a European country, and Pew coded such respondents in 2011 as other. European
emigrants were thus not included in our comparison of 2007 and 2011 results.
Missing data. In this report tabled percentages are calculated without missing responses (‘don’t know’ or
‘refused’) in the denominator.
Weighted vs. unweighted data. In their analysis of the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims, McCauley and Scheckter
used unweighted data.[11] In the present study, we compared results using both weighted and unweighted
data for both 2007 and 2011. Results were generally similar but there were some anomalous results using
weighting.
Pew recommends using weighted data to correct for sampling biases so that results can be more
representative of the population sampled. In the achieved samples of U.S. Muslims in both 2007 and 2011,
younger individuals with more education were over-represented and older individuals with less education
were under-represented.[12] Higher weights are thus given to older respondents with less education.
One such individual from South Asia reported himself as over fifty years of age, with a high school education,
and as a convert to Islam. His responses were weighted x6 and he was alone responsible for a change in the
percent of South Asian converts from two percent with unweighted data to eight percent with weighted data.
He also had a big influence on the South Asian correlation of convert status with approval of Al-Qaeda: the
correlation was negligible with unweighted data but .89 with weighted data.
Although weighting may be useful when results are aggregated across a thousand respondents, weighted data
can produce misleading results for analysis of a hundred respondents in a particular origin group. In this
Research Note we report results using unweighted data.
2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims—Results
Here we focus on perceptions of the war on terrorism. A full report of 2007 and 2011 results for items relating
to demographics, religiosity, perceived discrimination, and opinions of government policies can be found on
the START website.[13] For these items not reported here, 2007 and 2011 results were generally similar except
that presidential approval was substantially higher for President Obama (2011) than for President George W.
Bush (2007) and satisfaction with how things are going in the country was likewise higher in 2011 than in
2007.
Opinions relating to the war on terrorism. Table 1 shows that in both 2007 and 2011 about half of U.S.
Muslims (2007 49-81%; 2011 39-50%) did not believe that the war on terrorism (WOT) is a sincere effort
to reduce international terrorism. Two groups showed a substantial decline in doubts about the war on
terrorism (African-Americans 81% in 2007 vs. 50% in 2011, Iranians 66% in 2007 vs. 40% in 2011); indeed
every origin group showed a numeric decline in doubts about war on terrorism. This decline is likely
associated with the massive increases in presidential approval from 2007 to 2011.
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Table 1. Opinions related to the war on terrorism. Percent italicized responses.

Favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda (AQ) was low in both polls (1-12% in 2007 and 0-6% in 2011). Similarly,
justifying suicide bombing (SB) was low in both polls: 2-10% in 2007 and 2-9% in 2011.
The three terrorism-related items have non-negligible missing rates, raising the possibility that responses
may be biased by fear of the consequences of endorsing pro-terrorist opinions. But the pattern of missing
does not support this possibility. Table 1 shows that percentages of missing responses for the three terrorismrelated items are similar in 2007 and 2011, with 9-22% missing for the WOT item, 9-27% missing for the
AQ item, and 0-11% missing for the suicide bombing item. We believe that the most threatening of the three
items asks about justifying suicide bombing in defense of Islam, yet this item has lower missing rates than the
WOT item and AQ item. Overall, the pattern of missing data suggests that missing rates reflect more honest
ignorance than defensiveness.
Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that six of six origin groups showed a decline in percent missing
on the AQ item from 2007 to 2011. There is no reason defensiveness would decline, but ignorance might
decline as Al-Qaeda continued to be salient in the news during these years. Indeed bin Laden was killed in
May 2011 during the Pew poll conducted from 14 April to 22 July 2011.
Predicting radical opinions. As possible predictors of radical opinions we examined eight demographic items
and fourteen opinion items (six religiosity items, five discrimination items, three items evaluating the U.S.
government and its actions).
Based on substantial correlations between AQ and SB items (.24 in 2007 and .32 in 2011, with missing
recoded as described below) we created a RadOpinion scale as the mean of responses to these two items. (The
war on terrorism item was not correlated with AQ or SB items in 2007 or 2011). Thus four regression models
were calculated: for both 2007 and 2011, a model predicting opinion of the war on terrorism and a model
predicting RadOpinion.
To keep the number of respondents constant across the terrorism-related items, missing values for these
three items were recoded as mid-scale values. For instance, missing values for the SB items were recoded as
2.5 on the four-point scale for this item (often, sometimes, rarely, never justified). Also, to control for mean
opinion differences across origin groups, these groups were coded as dummy variables (African-Americans
the uncoded comparison group), and these dummy variables were included in each of the four regression
models. With so many predictors, we used a conservative level of significance and present here only
predictors with a beta significant at p<.01. Complete results of the regression models are available from the
authors.
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Table 2 shows that in 2007 there are four significant predictors of seeing the war on terrorism as insincere:
disapproval of President George W. Bush (beta .19), seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong decision
(beta .16), seeing discrimination in government surveillance (beta .15), and seeing media unfair to Muslims
(beta .13). In 2011 opinions are more crystalized. There is one outstanding predictor: seeing military force
in Afghanistan as a wrong decision (beta .34). The adjusted R squares (.20 in 2007; .22 in 2011) indicate that,
despite numerous and varied predictors, the level of prediction is only moderate.
Table 2: Regression predicting seeing the war on terrorism as insincere in 2007 and 2011
Beta
Predictor

2007

2011

Media unfair to Muslims

.13**

.06

Discrimination in USG surveillance - yes

.15**

.08

Disapprove president

.19**

.11

Afghanistan was wrong decision

.16**

.34**

R square

.25

.27

Adjusted R square

.20

.22

N

425

381

Note. Only predictors with beta significant at p<.01** are tabled, except predictors significant only in 2007 or
2011 show also the non-significant beta for comparison. Missing values were excluded within predictors, but
recoded as mid-value for the war on terrorism item predicted.
Table 3 shows that, in 2007 there is one significant predictor of RadOpinion: low education (beta .23). In
2011 there are two significant predictors: low education (beta .20) and feeling physically threatened as a
Muslim in the U.S. (beta .23). Again the adjusted R squares (.16 in 2007; .18 in 2011) indicate that the level of
prediction is only moderate.
Table 3: Regression predicting RadOpinion Scale in 2007 and 2011
Beta
Predictor

2007

2011

Education - low

.23**

.20**

Being physically threatened

.04

.23**

R square

.21

.24

Adjusted R square

.16

.18

N

425

381

Note. Only predictors with beta significant at p<.01** are tabled. Missing values were excluded within
predictors, but recoded as mid-value for items averaged in the RadOpinion Scale predicted.
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2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims—Discussion
We used the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S. Muslims to examine three opinions related to the war on
terrorism: seeing the war on terrorism as insincere, favorable opinion of Al-Qaeda, and justifying suicide
bombing in defense of Islam. We compared results for these items across time (2007 vs. 2011) and across six
origin groups (Pakistan, Iran, South Asian countries except Pakistan, Arab countries, sub-Saharan African
countries, and African-Americans).
Stability and change over time. U.S. Muslims maintained their overwhelming disapproval of Al-Qaeda and
suicide bombing; across origin groups and years, approval rates ranged from zero to twelve percent. Less
reassuring are the results for opinions of the war on terrorism: although every origin group showed at least
a small 2007-2011 decline in the percentage seeing the war on terrorism as insincere, in 2011 respondents
seeing the war on terrorism as insincere still ranged from 39-50 percent. That is, in 2011 close to half of
every origin group continued to see the war on terrorism as insincere.
Predicting opinion that the war on terrorism is insincere. In 2007 there were four significant predictors of
seeing the war on terrorism as insincere: disapproval of President Bush, seeing military force in Afghanistan
as a wrong decision, seeing discrimination in government surveillance of Muslims, and seeing media unfair
to Muslims. In 2011 there was only one significant predictor: seeing military force in Afghanistan as a wrong
decision predicts opinion of the war on terrorism as well as all four predictors taken together in 2007.
Our interpretation of this pattern is that disapproval of the war on terrorism in 2007 was part of a broad
mix of disapproval of the government and its actions, whereas in 2011, under President Obama, the war on
terrorism had crystalized to mean military intervention in Muslim countries.
Predicting RadOpinion. In 2007 only low education was a significant predictor of RadOpinion, that is, the
mean of opinion of Al-Qaeda and opinion of suicide bombing. In 2011 there were two significant predictors:
low education and reporting being physically threatened or attacked because of being Muslim. The one
consistent predictor, low education, is not statistically strong; we do not yet understand why a small minority
of U.S. Muslims have this radical opinion.
Group Differences. Broken down by origin group, results for two groups invite special attention: AfricanAmericans and Iran-born.
Table 1 shows a small but consistent tendency for African-American Muslims to have more radical opinions
than other origin groups. In 2007 and again in 2011, African-American respondents were most negative
toward the war on terrorism, most positive toward Al Qaeda, and most positive toward suicide bombing.
This consistency suggests that U.S. Muslims may not be a homogenous population and that generalizations
about “U.S. Muslims” may be misleading.[14]
Demographically, Iran-born Muslims stand out in both 2007 and 2011. They are older than other origin
groups, less religious than other groups on five of our six measures of religiosity, and they are Shi’a rather
than Sunni. Despite these differences, their opinions of U.S. government policies look like the opinions
of other origin groups. Notably, they are no less likely than other groups to see the war on terrorism as
insincere, and no different in their opinions of Al-Qaeda and suicide bombing.
These results are important in showing just how broadly U.S. Muslims disapprove of the war on terrorism.
Even Shi’a Muslims in the U.S.–who have sectarian reasons for disliking Sunni-based Al-Qaeda–even Shi’a
Muslims show substantial disapproval of the war on terrorism (insincere 66 percent in 2007, 40 percent in
2011).
In brief, results from the Pew 2007 and 2011 polls of U.S. Muslims have provided one strong predictor of
opinion of the war on terrorism—disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan–but only weak and inconsistent
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predictors of opinions of Al Qaeda and suicide bombing. Seeking better predictors and more recent
assessment of the opinions of U.S. Muslims, we turn now to three Internet polls of U.S. Muslims.
Tracking Radical Opinions in Internet Polls of U.S. Muslims
The research presented in this section is part of a multi-year research project exploring the use of Internet
polling as a tool to access opinions and attitudes of U.S. Muslims.

Internet polls of U.S. Muslims--Methods
Panel recruitment. Samples reported here were recruited and data collected by Knowledge Networks (KN),
a division of international market research corporation GfK. Sampling begins from the KnowledgePanel,
whose members are recruited through national random samples of the U.S., originally by telephone and now
almost entirely by postal mail. Households are provided with access to the Internet and a netbook computer,
if needed. KnowledgePanel is thus representative of the U.S. adult population, with panel members from
listed and unlisted telephone numbers, from telephone, non-telephone and cell-phone-only households, as
well as households with and without Internet access.
The target population for our research consists of non-institutionalized adults age 18 and over residing in the
United States who identify as Muslim. To sample this population, KN identified Muslim households from
the KnowledgePanel and solicited their participation in our study, which has so far included six waves of
polling. The results reported here from Waves 4, 5, and 6 had respectively 90, 88, and 87 respondents from
KnowledgePanel (about a 50 percent return rate from the panel samples).
In addition, KN recruited ‘opt-in” (volunteer) Muslim respondents from other polling vendors that included
respectively 121, 124, and 127 respondents (about a one percent return rate from the opt-in solicitation). The
opt-in sample was included to raise the number of respondents to 200, to give more stability to percentages
and correlations in our analyses. The cost of this sample enlargement is the threat of unrepresentative results
from the opt-in sample. Comparison of results for KnowledgePanel participants with results from the
combined panel and opt-in participants suggests that this threat is minimal. This comparison and additional
details about KnowledgePanel procedures are available in an overview of Waves 1-3 available on the START
website.[15]
For a multi-wave tracking poll, stability of sample characteristics is perhaps as important as
representativeness. Even a sample that is not fully representative can capture change in opinion if the
characteristics of the sample do not change over time. Our goal was a sampling procedure that could be
repeated to produce stable sample characteristics such that at least large changes in opinion over time could
be detected. Our design goal was a stability that would permit confidence in measuring changes of opinion of
more than 15 percentage points. This kind of stability is evident in the Results reported here for three waves
of polling of U.S. Muslims.
The three polls were fielded as follows: Wave 4 28 January–17 February 2016, Wave 5 26 May–15 June 2016,
Wave 6 28 October–8 November 2016. These dates are abbreviated to the closest month in Table 4.
Poll items. As with the Pew polls, we focus on two items assessing opinion radicalization of U.S. Muslims: a
question about the war on terrorism and a question about suicide bombing and other attacks on civilians in
defense of Islam.
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Internet Polls of U.S. Muslims—Results
We first look for change over time in opinions about the war on terrorism and suicide bombing, then look for
predictors of opinion on these two items. In comparisons across waves we focus on substantial differences,
differences of fifteen percentage points or more (statistically, for two groups each with n=210, differences of
15 percentage points are significant at p<.01 two tailed).
Tracking opinions over time. Rather than asking about whether the war on terrorism is insincere, as the Pew
polls did, we asked more directly Do you feel the war on terrorism is a war against Islam? (Yes; No; Not sure/
Don’t know) Table 4 shows that there was a substantial decrease in the percent of U.S. Muslims saying ‘yes’ to
this question: from 47 percent in January 2016 to 30 percent in June 2016 and 32 percent in October 2016.
Table 4: Radical opinions in three waves of internet polling of U.S. Muslims
Wave 4
					Jan 2016

Wave 5

Wave 6

Jun 2016

Oct 2016

					N 211		N 212		N 216			
War on Islam
Percent yes 			

47		 30		 32

Suicide Bombing
Percent often or
sometimes justified			

10		 8		 9

More difficult to be Muslim		
Percent yes				39		 49		 -People acted suspicious of you
Percent yes				54		 27		 -Been called offensive names
Percent yes				73		 19		 -U.S. policies dictated by Jewish
Interests. Percent agree		 21		 43		 47
Note. Items not included in the Wave 5 poll are indicated as --.			
Our internet polls used the same question about justifying suicide bombing and other attacks on civilians
used in the Pew polls (See Table 1). Table 4 shows no change over time in response to this question: the
percent seeing suicide bombing as often or sometimes justified was 10 percent, 8 percent, and 9 percent
across Waves 4-6. It is worth noting that this kind of consistency over time indicates that our sample
characteristics are stable over time, and adds confidence to the demonstration of substantial change for
opinions about the war on terrorism noted in the preceding paragraph.
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The 2015 jihadist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino prompted us to include in Waves 4 and 5 three
questions about experience of discrimination. The first question is general. Since the 2015 terrorist attacks
in Paris and San Bernardino, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S., or hasn’t it changed very
much? (Has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.; Hasn’t changed very much; Not sure/Don’t know).
The second and third questions are about personal experience. Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and
San Bernardino, have people acted as if they are suspicious of you? (Yes, has happened; No, has not happened;
Not sure/Don’t know). Since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, have you been called
offensive names? (Yes, has happened; No, has not happened; Not sure/Don’t know).
Table 4 shows substantial change in opinion for two of the three discrimination items. From Wave 4 to Wave
5, reports of suspicion and offensive names declined respectively from 54 percent to 27 percent and from
73 percent to 19 percent. These declines occurred despite the same time reference: “Since the 2015 terrorist
attacks in Paris and San Bernardino.” Of course respondents may be reporting feelings of being discriminated
against, rather than recalling specific incidents of discrimination. But the question remains, what explains the
substantial changes of report on these two items?
It seems possible that the perception of suspicion and hostility toward U.S. Muslims peaked shortly after the
San Bernardino attack on the first of December 2015. Our January 2016 poll could catch this peak, but by the
time of our June 2016 poll U.S. Muslims had recovered much of their confidence that life in the U.S. was not
so threatening after all.
Finally, we included in Waves 4-6 an item about U.S. foreign policies. Some people say that U.S. foreign
policies are dictated by Jewish interests. How do you feel about this? (Agree; Disagree; Not sure). Table 4 shows
substantial change in opinion on this question. From 21 percent in January 2016, agreement increased to 43
percent and 47 percent in June and October 2016.
This opinion change may be related to the rise of Donald Trump, who was not seen as a serious candidate in
January 2016 but by June was reaching for the Republican nomination he won in July and by October was
reaching for the presidency he won in November. In March 2016 both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton
appeared before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee; both promised security for Israel but Trump
went further in promising to move the capital of Israel to Jerusalem. He ended with the thought that his
daughter Ivanka was about to have a beautiful Jewish baby. It is possible then that the political ascendance of
Donald Trump led U.S. Muslims to see increasing Jewish influence in U.S. foreign policy.
To summarize what we have learned about radical opinions of U.S. Muslims: perception of war on Islam
decreased between January and June 2016 (47 percent to 30 percent), justification of suicide bombing was
unchanged (about ten percent justifying).
In the next two sections we look for correlates of opinions on these two items. Our Internet polls had much
smaller samples (around 200 respondents) than the Pew polls (around 1000 respondents). Regression
analyses using dozens of predictors were therefore not attempted with the Internet polls, but simple
correlations were calculated.
Predicting perception of a war on Islam. In order to test whether perceived discrimination might be related
to seeing a war on Islam, we combined the three discrimination items into a scale. For the general item, Has
become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. was coded 3, Hasn’t changed very much was coded 1, and Not
sure/Don’t know was coded 2. For the two personal experience items, Yes was coded 3, No was coded 1, and
Not sure/Don’t know was coded 2. For Wave 4 the discrimination scale had M(211)=2.47 with SD=.47 and
alpha=.63. For Wave 5 the discrimination scale had M(212)=1.76 with SD=.67 and alpha=.66.
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Numerical values were similarly assigned to responses to the questions about a war on Islam, suicide
bombing, and seeing U.S. foreign policies dictated by Jewish interests.
The discrimination scale was significantly related to seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, r(209)=.26
p<.01 in Wave 4 and r(210)=.41 p<.01 in Wave 5.
Seeing U.S. policies dictated by Jewish interests was also significantly related to seeing the war on terrorism as
a war on Islam: r(209)=.32 p<.01 in Wave 4 and r(210)=.23, p<.01 in Wave 5.
The two predictors were not consistently correlated: discrimination with policies dictated by Jewish interests
was r(209)=.07 ns in Wave 4 and r(210)=.22, p<.01 in Wave 5.
Taken together these results indicate that there are two different sources of the opinion that the war on
terrorism is a war on Islam: perceived discrimination and opposition to U.S. foreign policies.
Predicting justification of suicide bombing. Results were disappointing. For the Pew polls, low education was a
consistent if weak predictor of the RadOpinion scale that averaged opinion of suicide bombing and opinion
of Al-Qaeda. But for the January, June, and October 2016 Internet polls, correlations of education with
opinion of suicide bombing were inconsistent and small, never reaching the .01 level of significance. Younger
age was significantly correlated with justifying suicide bombing in the June and October 2016 polls: r(210)=.25 p<.01 and r(214)=-.18 p<.01. But the correlation of age and opinion of suicide bombing in the January
2016 poll was not significant at r(209)=-.09.
Thus, across both the Pew polls and the Internet polls, there is no strong and consistent correlate of justifying
suicide bombing. Although perceived discrimination and seeing U.S. foreign policy as dictated by Jewish
interests predicted seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, they did not predict justifying suicide
bombing.
General Discussion
This report examined two kinds of polling data—telephone polls and internet polls—in order to track and
understand radical opinions held by some U.S. Muslims.
We began by examining opinions about the war on terrorism, suicide bombing, and al Qaeda as assessed in
the 2007 and 2011 Pew telephone polls of U.S. Muslims. We found some small differences by origin groups,
especially for African-American Muslims, but in general results indicated change over time only for opinions
of the war on terrorism: a majority of U.S. Muslims saw this war as ‘insincere’ in 2007 but only about half saw
it as insincere in 2011. Opinions of al Qaeda and suicide bombing showed no change: in both 2007 and 2011,
a small but persistent minority of less than ten percent of respondents had favorable views of al Qaeda or
justified suicide bombing.
We used correlational analyses to try to understand what was different about respondents with radical
opinions. For opinions of the war on terrorism, results indicated that a consistent and strong predictor was
negative opinion of U.S. foreign policy as represented by disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. For
opinions of al Qaeda and suicide bombing, correlational analyses were less successful: low education was the
only consistent predictor of radical opinions on these items, and was only a weak predictor.
We turned then to examining opinions of the war on terrorism and of suicide bombing in three internet polls
of U.S. Muslims conducted in 2016. Results showed substantial change in opinion of the war on terrorism:
in January 2016 about half of U.S. Muslims saw a war on Islam but in June and October 2016 only about a
third saw a war on Islam. This change in opinion coincided with a decrease in perceived discrimination, and
correlational analyses within both the January and June 2016 polls showed that indeed individuals feeling less

ISSN 2334-3745

46

April 2017

PERSPECTI VES O N TERRORISM

Volume 11, Issue 2

discrimination were less likely to see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam. We conclude that at least part of
seeing a war on Islam comes from feeling discrimination in the U.S.
But another part seems to come from disapproval of U.S. foreign policies. Seeing U.S. foreign policies as
dictated by Jewish interests was correlated with seeing a war on Islam in both the January and June 2016
internet polls. Confirming the relation between foreign policy and seeing a war on Islam is the observation
from the Pew polls that disapproval of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was the best predictor of seeing a war on
Islam.
It appears then that, for U.S. Muslims, there are two sources of seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam:
perception of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S. and disapproval of U.S. policies relating to Muslims
abroad. If this conclusion is correct, then the war of ideas might try to attack perception of a war on Islam
in one or both of two directions. One direction would be to reduce the reality or at least the perception of
discrimination against Muslims in the U.S. The other direction would be to reduce U.S. interventions in
predominantly Muslim countries, or at least to explain better the need for such interventions.
Numerous polls of U.S. Muslims have assessed opinions representing the sympathizer and justifier levels
of the opinion radicalization pyramid, and these opinions—about the war on terrorism and about suicide
bombing and other attacks on civilians in defense of Islam—were the focus of the current study. We examine
first the 2007 and 2011 Pew telephone polls of Opinions about suicide bombing against civilians in defense of
Islam remain opaque. There has not been any change in opinions justifying suicide bombing: Internet polls
in January, June, and October 2016 are like the Pew polls in 2007 and 2011 in showing a persistent minority,
ten percent or less of U.S. Muslims, justifying suicide bombing. And we have not yet identified a strong or
consistent predictor of opinions about suicide bombing. Better understanding of how a small minority of U.S.
Muslims persist in justifying suicide bombing should be a priority for future research.
Finally, our results indicate that small-sample internet polling can track at least large shifts in the opinions
of U.S. Muslims, that is, shifts of fifteen percentage points or more. The pattern of stability in opinions
about suicide bombing gives confidence to observed changes in opinions about the war on terrorism, about
discrimination, and about U.S. foreign policy. As an alternative to the traditional telephone polling, Internet
polling offers the advantages of lower cost and faster turn-around. These advantages can be especially
useful for assessing reactions to unfolding political events, or when longer-term changes require repeated
assessment to observe trends.
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